Custom and Democracy in the Pacific Islands

A report prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat

by

Peter Larmour

Introduction

An editorial in the Fiji Times once asked if democracy might be a 'foreign flower', unable to take root in South Pacific soil. Political leaders have also been critical of introduced institutions. *Time* magazine quoted Tupua Efi of Samoa: 'For us the Westminster system is part of an alien culture' (*Time* 24 4 00). Hilda Lini, the first woman MP and Minister in Vanuatu is investigating 'the use of indigenous models of governance as the foundation for state governments' (Lini 2002).

There is a tension between chiefly and democratic forms of government in the Pacific islands (particularly in Tonga, and to some extent Fiji and Samoa). However, the paper argues that there are also more widespread tensions about the particular form of democracy that has been adopted in Pacific island countries, as in other parts of the world. These have to do with representation, constitutionalism and liberalism, as much as with democracy itself. Some of these issues also arise in other developing countries, and in multicultural Western societies, particularly those with indigenous minorities. The paper introduces some recent political theory might help untangle some of the issues and raise questions for discussion.

1. Custom and Chiefs
1.1 Custom refers to 'a particular, established way of behaving' (Concise Oxford Dictionary). Here our concern with is with political customs, which vary from place to place. The Polynesian societies in the region share a common belief in 'genealogical rank, primogeniture, mana (power or efficiency) and tapu (sacred, prohibited)' (Kirch 1989:28), but these common political forms developed differently as Polynesians settled in different places. At one extreme, in Hawaii or Tahiti, they became extremely hierarchical. Chiefs lived separately from commoners, and the religious and secular functions of chiefs were also distinct. At the other extreme and chiefs shared decisionmaking in village meetings with other adult males (ibid: 35). Traditions of authority also produce traditions of resistance and justified rebellion against it.

1.2 The anthropologist Marshall Sahlins (1963) famously distinguished these chiefly systems, based on inheritance, from the more egalitarian 'big man' systems in Melanesia, based on achievement. These were 'ideal types' and the reality is more complicated. There are all kinds of chief in Melanesia and Micronesia, but also strong traditions of equality between adult men speaking in village meetings, for example in parts of Micronesia (Tabokai, 1993: 26-27). Hilda Lini, quoted above, is a chief on her island of Pentecost.

1.3 In any case they were all strongly influenced by contact with introduced political systems. Monarchical systems emerged in parts of Polynesia, and survived in Tonga and to some extent Samoa (in the tama'aiga titles). Colonial governments recognised or created chiefs through whom they could work. Colonial rule was also resisted by chiefs. Western Samoa's Mau movement in the 1920s, for example, was for the restoration of chiefly, rather than popular, authority against New Zealand colonialism (Meleisea 1987: 126-8). Decolonisation often involved the recognition, restoration or reconstruction of chiefly systems. There is provision for councils of chiefs in several constitutions.

1.4 The Tongan constitution is an important special case. It created a constitutional monarchy out of a chiefly system, enfranchising adult men, but enshrining the power of a nobility. It was a radical transformation of Tongan society, including its land tenure system, following 'international best practice' of its time. It allowed Tonga to avoid direct colonial rule. Now it looks out of step. Only 9 of seats in the legislature are elected by universal adult suffrage, and 9 are reserved for 33 noble families. The executive is chosen by the king, but is not responsible to parliament as in Westminster systems. A pro democracy movement has been active since 1989.

1.5 Samoa set the precedent for a 'home grown' constitution that tried to reconcile introduced and indigenous political institutions that were themselves partly created by colonial rule. In Samoa the role of matai emerged from chiefly precedents and colonial rule in the early twentieth century. Matai were chosen by family groups, on the basis of personality and achievements (Tcherkezoff 2000). The 1962 constitution allowed the matai suffrage to persist until a referendum in 1990 after which when the electoral act was amended to allow universal adult suffrage (though only matai are allowed to stand for election). At the same time, however, unelected village fono were given increased autonomy, and there have been a series of awkward cases in which fono have punished or banished non-conforming individuals - one case involved a murder.

1.6 Anthropologists Geoff White and Monty Lindstrom indentify three types of chiefs today. First there is the 'statesman', standing for the nation or group as a whole (Ratu Mara was a good example). They note that abuse of this kind of position has sometimes sparked protest. Second is the 'bureaucrat', doing less glamorous and more routine work as a
broker between government and rural people, dealing with complaints, and settling disputes. Third, chiefs sometimes become a focus for opposition, standing up for traditional or peripheral interests against a central government (1997: 10-17). The role of chiefs continues to be contested. The status of the Great Council of Chiefs has been a particular issue in Fiji, with a chiefs’ party, the SVT dominant in politics in the 1990s. Unimane have dissolved a local government in Kiribati. The Cook Islands government has sometimes favoured the central, monarchical aspects of chieftaincy, and sometimes the decentralised, and local aspects. Vanuatu's chiefs played an important role in ending riots in the capital. They have an executive office, but the symbolic importance of their meeting house built on a hill above parliament is now matched by a donor funded building housing the National Council of Women. An attempt by the Solomon Islands government to provide for local government by chiefs, rather than through elections, was found to be unconstitutional.

2. Forms of Democracy

2.1 The word democracy means 'rule by the people'. The political scientist David Held (1987) argues that representative democracy is an invention of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, only consolidated since the second world war, and apparently triumphant since the collapse of communist party forms of democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Before then, it was regarded with some suspicion. Representative democracy is distinct from the participatory, but socially exclusive, forms of self government celebrated in the Greek city states like Athens which provide Western political theory with its basic political ideas. These city states also inspire some Tongan intellectuals. The Atenisi Institute which 'places criticism at the very heart of education' was so named by 'because its philosophy of education passionately embraces both the scientific and democratic ideals advanced by the ancient Greeks' (Atenisi Institute 2002). The largest Greek city states had populations of about 50,000 which is about the median population of modern Pacific Island states. They were participatory for adult men, but disenfranchised women, foreigners and slaves.

2.2 The proponents of representative democracy argued that representation made democracy feasible for much larger political systems, while protecting citizens from from the excesses of mob rule, on the one hand, and the excesses of state officials on the other.

2.3 Modern democracy is also constitutional (see Table 1). While many political systems have had founding documents or charters, the distinctive point of modern constitutionalism (following the US model) is that it tries to limit the power of government, and protect what are regarded as the prior rights of individuals and, in some cases, groups. For example, the protection of land rights is an issue throughout the Pacific, and constitutionalism is meant to calm the fears of landowners who worry that democratic majorities will vote to take their property from them. Anxieties about what the elected government planned to do about land contributed to support for coups in Fiji.

2.4 These constitutions are liberal in the sense that they generally protect the rights of individuals to live their lives with the minimum of interference from governments (but some are illiberal in the sense that they limit the sale of some kinds of land) Rights of freedom of movement and religion have been particularly controversial in the Pacific Islands. In Solomon Islands, 'freedom of movement' is often cited as a contributing cause to the recent ethnic conflict. In Samoa village fono have tried to banish or bake alive people who tried to introduce new religions (Va'a 2000). Sometimes these protections are
enshrined in a Bill of Rights, and for example the new constitution’s protection against discrimination on the grounds of sexuality became an issue in Fiji.

2.5 In the South Pacific, democracy has had a complicated relationship with colonial rule. The Fijian anthropologist Asesela Ravuvu argues 'There never has been democracy as it was defined in the West. It was 'an illusion, a façade, a parting whim of a colonial power that had itself only practised dictatorship' (1991: 87). The Papua New Guinean law professor, Tony Deklin argues that in parts of Melanesia colonial rule extinguished precontact forms of direct democracy and independence has only partly restored them (Deklin 1992: 36-39). Decolonisation introduced representative democracy, at local and later national levels. Yet, indigenous resistance to the introduction of 'multiracial' local government councils in PNG in the late 1960s precipitated the most violent and sustained threat to Australian rule in the territory, by the Mataungan movement around Rabaul. Table 1 shows the pattern of constitutions adopted mainly, but not only, around the time of independence.
### Table 1

**Constitutions in the Commonwealth Pacific Islands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (latest)</th>
<th>Date of Adoption</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>1875</td>
<td>Adopted to centralise, modernise and stave off colonial rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa</td>
<td>173,000</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Adopted at independence from New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Adopted at independence from Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>4.8 million</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Adopted at independence from Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>446,000</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Adopted at independence from UK, police/civilian coup forced change of government in 2000, reviewed in 2001 in favour of a 'homegrown state government' system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Adopted after separation from Kiribati, and at independence from UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Adopted at independence from UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>192,000</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Adopted at independence from UK and France</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: R. Crocombe *The South Pacific* (Suva: USP 2001)
2.6 In the West democracy is usually compared with aristocracy and monarchy. Similar comparisons - positive and negative - are made in Tonga, and sometimes by conservative supporters of chiefly authority in Samoa or Fiji. For example, the historian Ian Campbell quotes the King of Tonga 'citing the histories of Spain, Germany and Russia as examples of ruthless tyrannies that had democratic origins, and warning of the dangers of coups d’etat '(Campbell 1989: 92). A pro-democracy movement began in Tonga in 1989, when ‘Akilisi Pohiva led a walkout of commoner MPs. It has recently proposed a program for a 'democratic monarchy', with a popularly elected House of Representatives, and a House of Nobles, elected by nobles. The king would appoint a Prime Minister from either house, and would hold a power of veto over legislation, that could be overridden by a joint meeting of both houses (Pacific Islands Monthly June 2002).

2.7 However, more and different issues are at stake in other parts of the region, particularly in outer islands and rural areas. There it is the particular form that democracy takes, rather than the principle of 'rule by the people' that is at stake. That form is representative, constitutional and liberal. The second half of the paper considers some problems with these characteristics, and suggests how some arguments from political theory might be relevant to the Pacific islands.

3 Problems with Representative Democracy

3.1 A frequent criticism of representative democracy is that it restricts participation to election campaigns, and allows representatives to live in the capital while ignoring their constituents. This is contrasted with the more participatory style of face-face village meetings, when leaders lived among their followers (and were subject to sanctions, even assassination if they failed to perform). Procedures like referenda, stronger local government and (in Kiribati) the requirement that national legislation is considered on outer islands before it is finally voted upon are designed to increase participation. Parliamentary committees that tour the country, holding meetings in every village, are another attempt to increase, or restore, participation.

3.2 Participation can range from simply being informed or consulted, through to forms of local control over policies and public service appointments. Some of the pressure for more federal, decentralised and traditional systems of government in the region comes from a desire for more participation. Yet participation may not extend to everyone, and local government or village meetings may exclude women or young men.

3.3 The political theorist Hanna Pitkin argues that Parliament can 'represent' society in three ways: symbolic, statistical, and by acting on behalf of constituents, or the country as a whole.

3.4 In the first, symbolic, sense parliaments do so through their architecture, ritual and procedures. Provisions for Houses of Chiefs, Ariki or Iroij are also representative in this symbolic sense. Arguments about the role (or, in Fiji, race) of the head of state are often about representation in this symbolic sense.

3.5 Second, it may be more or less typical, in a statistical sense, of the society, including people from each region, men as well as women, nobles and commoners, ethnic Indians and ethnic Fijians. Pacific parliaments are often faulted for being unrepresentative in this statistical sense. Few women are elected, in proportion to their numbers in the population.
Educated or non-indigenous people or chiefs or 'naturalised citizens' are sometimes over represented in proportion to their numbers. Parliament does not 'look like' the country it represents. Some of PNG's provincial constitutions, for example, required the cooption of women members if none are elected. Or electoral systems are designed, and redesigned, as in Fiji, to achieve particular racial outcomes.

3.6 MPs might say that this does not matter. They could say they represent voters in the third sense, by acting on their behalf. It's their job. Older men represent the interests of women and younger men. Educated people speak on behalf of uneducated. Matai represent their families. Fijian chiefs can look after the interests of other races. This meaning of representation is, of course, controversial. Edmund Burke’s famous ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’ in 1774 argued that representatives are not simply the instrument of those they represent: "Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion." Yet many people do not like others claiming to speak on their behalf: women or minorities, for example, might rather speak for themselves. Voters everywhere get irritated when MPs act independently, and many demand referendums instead of representation. Problems of representation are reflected in widespread suspicions of 'corruption' throughout the region - suspicions that leaders are acting for their own benefit, or on behalf of foreign companies, rather than in the interests of their constituents, or the country as a whole (Larmour 1997).

4. Problems with Constitutional Democracy

4.1 The word ‘constitution’ refers to a law setting out the basic framework of government. Often it is entrenched, requiring special majorities, or several sittings of parliament, before it can be changed. Many traditional, ancient and medieval political systems have been based on documents, covenants, agreements or laws. But the modern idea of constitutionalism consists of the idea that power of government should in some way be self-limited. Thus the political scientist Giovanni Sartori defines constitutions as

First and above all, instruments of government which limit, restrain and allow for the control of the exercise of political power (1997: 196)

4.2 The original model is the US constitution, with its bill of rights (introduced in 1791), and its architecture of institutional checks and balances.

4.3 Elected politicians everywhere are often frustrated with the constraints on their actions created by constitutions, constitutional officeholders (like the Ombudsmen in Vanuatu or the Auditor General in Samoa) the judiciary and the Opposition. They claim the legitimacy of election and majority rule.

4.4 However there may be a special problem with the type of constitutionalism adopted in the West. It has to do with the assumption that everyone is the same. The Canadian political theorist James Tully is critical of the modern constitutional idea of 'a culturally homogeneous and sovereign people' founding an independent and self governing nation state with a set of uniform legal and representative political institutions in which all citizens are treated equally, whether their association is considered to be a society of individuals, a nation, or a community (1995: 41)
4.5 Such modern constitutions self consciously set themselves against, and above the irregular 'ancient constitutions' that preceded them, based on custom and tradition. But the break with the past was never complete, and 'hidden constitutions' based on convention persist within modern states.

4.6 In breaking with the past, and assuming homogeneity, Tully argues that modern constitutionalism cannot deal with differences within as well as between states. For an alternative set of constitutional principles, he looks to the margins of the expansion of European states, and at the principles that governed early treaty making between them, and the indigenous people they fought and negotiated with. In this period between contact and colonisation the balance of power was less unequal than it became, and combined and intermediate forms of governance. These early soldiers, traders and explorers were quite aware that the Aboriginal peoples did not have European-style states, representative institutions, formalised legal systems, prisons and independent executives. They observed conciliar and confederal forms of government, consensus decision-making, rule by authority rather than coercion, and customary law (Tully 1995: 121)

4.7 On their side, North American Aboriginal peoples had long traditions of recognising each others' independence, and entering into treaties - traditions into which their early encounters with Europeans could easily fit. From these treaties, and the constitutional debates and court cases they led to, Tully distils three constitutional conventions that, he argues, can be used to accommodate diversity today:

- mutual recognition
- continuity
- consent (Tully 1995: 116)

We could contrast these, for example, with the French revolutionary principles of

- liberty
- equality
- fraternity

4.8 Mutual recognition requires to each side to recognise the continuing, separate, existence of the other. Continuity prevents a sharp or revolutionary break with either side's past way of doing things. Consent requires the agreement of both sides. Such principles were broken in later European efforts to discredit, assimilate and extinguish aboriginal forms of organisation in, say, Australia, though they are being partially reconstructed in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), and the recognition of continuity of 'native title' in the High Court's Mabo and Wik decisions. They are also being revived in the new centrality given to the Treaty of Waitangi, and biculturalism, in the constitution of New Zealand. But the principles go wider, and Tully goes on to apply them to the claims of Quebec, immigrant minorities, and women.

4.9 Tully also considers liberal concerns with treaty constitutionalism, particularly the fear that 'as the administrative dictatorships over Aboriginal peoples are dismantled, they may leave a class of Aboriginal male elites in power' (1995: 193). He notes that traditional
leaderships depended on the continuous consent of their members, and had to rely heavily on consensus. In any case, he argues, Aboriginal communities should be subject to the same principles of mutual recognition, continuity and consent in their internal organisation as they claimed in relation to external authorities.

4.10 How might these arguments apply in the Pacific islands? There are nineteenth century examples of ‘treaty constitutions’ in Fiji or Cook Islands, combining the interests of settlers with the appearance of rule by chiefs. They were overwhelmed by colonial rule, and succeeded by ‘national’ constitutions. Tonga’s constitution was also a quite thoroughgoing and modernistic reform of a traditional society, and reconstruction under a constitution. Postcolonial constitutions provide for chiefly institutions, and there is a debate in Fiji about whether the Bose Levu Vakaturanga (Great Council of Chiefs) derives its authority from the constitution, and is subject to law, or whether it derives it independently, in a more ‘treaty-like’ way, from the Deed of Cession with Britain. Debates about autonomy in Bougainville, or federalism in Solomon Islands pit arguments for national sovereignty and cohesion against arguments for mutual recognition, continuity and consent. The latter now seem to be winning, as the PNG government accepts a form of autonomy for Bougainville, and the Solomon Islands moves towards federalism.

4.11 There also might be worries about the willingness of indigenous male elites to apply the principles of ‘mutual recognition, continuity and consent’ to differences within countries, for example in relation to women, or religious or other minorities. Chiefs, for example, may no longer rely on consensus, or continuing popular support - they now live in the capital, and are protected by legislation. Also, the Samoan historian, Malama Meleisea warns of the ‘moral confusion’ that can arise when traditional and introduced systems lie side by side, and individuals can switch opportunistically between them: ‘we have two sets of social and political values, either of which may be appealed to as it suits us’ (2000: 198).

5. Problems with Liberal Democracy

5.1 Pacific Island democracy is not necessarily liberal or individualistic, particularly in rural areas. For example, a national survey of voters in Papua New Guinea found 39% did not regard casting their vote as an individual matter, deferring instead to community meetings, clan heads, councillors or church leaders (Saffu, 1989: 21). Popular opinion is often found to be in favour of tighter controls on young people, women, migrants or 'non-conformist people'.

5.2 Postcolonial constitutional reviews find popular resistance to human rights provisions, for example those, guaranteeing freedom of movement. Solomon Islands 1987 review, for example, advocated the restoration of capital punishment, limits on the introduction of new religions, limits on the number of political parties, limits on freedom of movement between provinces and discrimination in favour of indigenous people. Setting up a similar committee in Vanuatu the Prime Minister called upon it to overhaul constitutional provisions for human rights.

5.3 The political scientist Biku Parekh argues that in the modern history of the West, 'liberalism preceded democracy by nearly two centuries and created a world to which the latter had to adjust' (1992: 161). Liberalism involves a conception of the autonomous individual, able to stand outside a particular community, and to create or reject institutions
on the basis of calculations of self interest. Individuals are thought of as existing prior to governments, and democracy is one of the ways that individual liberty can be protected against oppressive governments. This conception, suggests Parekh, is quite different from that assumptions underlying Athenian democracy, in which the community is conceptually prior to the individual, and individual freedom lies in active participation in government, rather than in a private space protected from it. This is not to say that liberal democracy is defective, merely that its own history shows it is not necessarily universally valid. He argues that liberal democracy may be of limited relevance in two circumstances: 'cohesive polities with a strong sense of community and multicomunal polities' (ibid: 169).

5.4 In the first case, Parekh argues, as in some Islamic societies, people may be defined and individuated differently, with a different sense of rights and duties, and relationship between state and society. In the second case, as in India, some laws may apply to some groups but not others, and an overriding concern to avoid communal violence may mean the restriction on some individual rights. In the first case there may be a different conceptualisation of the relationship between individuals and community. In the second case a plurality of ethnic, tribal or religious communities may themselves be bearers of rights, with different laws governing the members of each.

5.5 In rejecting the universal claims of liberal democracy, Parekh is not arguing for complete relativism. Instead he proposes the development of cross cultural consensus about principles of good government that allow diverse, culturally specific interpretation, while mobilising domestic and international pressure against 'grossly outrageous practices and customs' (ibid: 171). Such a 'body of moral and political principles that are both universally valid and capable of accommodating cultural diversity and autonomy', and against which the culturally particular standards might be judged (ibid: 173). It would act as a floor above which different rooms could be built. It would have to be negotiated globally, rather than imposed by Western governments. He suggests the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights as a model.

5.6 Parekh's argument might apply both to cohesive monocultures, like (say) Kiribati and multicultural polities, like (say) Fiji, and states like PNG which share characteristics of both. But it is not a blank cheque for illiberalism: there is a floor of rights below which governments cannot go. It allows for criticism of particular regimes on several grounds: that they are selectively interpreting tradition; that the societies they govern are not, in fact, the cohesive communities their rulers claim them to be; and that, whatever values the community holds, these violate emerging international norms.

5.7 Another Canadian political theorist, Will Kymlicka offers a different way of reconciling liberalism with indigenous rights (he was writing particularly about the claims of Aboriginal people, and of Quebeckers to a 'distinct society'.) He wants to defend liberalism from charges of individualism, and he shows how cultural membership is prior to individualism. It provides the foundation for the ability to question and choose one's own path that liberalism values. The knowledge and confidence to choose is a result of having been brought up in a secure community (any community). Cultural membership is thus a kind of primary good to which everyone is entitled: it is a 'precondition of self respect' (1989: 192-3).

5.8 Kymlicka's argument allows a liberal defence of special laws and treatment for Aboriginal groups. The defence is that that clear and present threats to the survival of their cultural
community deprive its members of the ability to grow up with sufficient self respect and self confidence to make liberal choices - including, perhaps, the choice to reject or adapt some of their community's values.

5.9 In relation to the Pacific Islands Kymlicka's argument might emphasise the way indigenous cultures, unlike those introduced by settlers, are particularly vulnerable. They exist nowhere else and as a global culture replaces a colonial one they tend to be on the defensive. Special protection of island culture might therefore be justified in order that young islanders can be brought up as confident individuals free, perhaps, to question aspects of that culture, change it, reject it, or to choose to live elsewhere.

5.10 For example Kymlicka's argument about upbringing addresses questions of the future of Fijian culture that have been at the heart of earlier diagnoses of Fijian society, for example in the Burns and Spate Commissions (Ravuvu 1991: 51). It also might account for the signs of greater ethnic Fijian willingness to question Fijian institutions since the 1987 coups. Greater self-confidence leads to greater questioning. He distinguishes somewhat between aboriginal and Quebec claims, arguing that while French Canadian life and institutions changed radically during the 1960s, the community itself was never 'threatened with unwanted extinction or assimilation as aboriginal communities are currently threatened' (1989: 167). The question might be whether fears of extinction or assimilation are realistic in Fiji, or anywhere else in the region.
References

Atenisi Institute, 2002  http://kalianet.to/atenisi/institute/institute.html


Deklin, T., 1992 'Culture and Democracy in Papua New Guinea: "Marit Tru or Giaman Marit"' in R. Crocombe et al eds Culture And Democracy in the South Pacific Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies


Huffer E. and A. So'o, eds 2000. Governance in Samoa Canberra and Suva: Asia Pacific Press and Institute of Pacific Studies


Larmour, P., 1994 'A Foreign Flower: Democracy in the South Pacific' Pacific Studies 17(1): 45-77

Larmour, P., 1997 'Corruption and Governance in the South Pacific' Pacific Studies 20(3):1-17


Meleisea, M, 2000 'Governance, Development and Leadership in Polynesia’ in E. Huffer and A. So'o, eds Governance in Samoa Canberra and Suva: Asia Pacific Press and Institute of Pacific Studies pp 189-200

Parekh, B., 1992 'The Cultural Particularity of Liberal Democracy' Political Studies XL: 160-175


Sahlins, M., 1963 'Poor man, rich man, big man, chief: political types in Melanesia and Polynesia' Comparative Studies in Society and History 5: 285-303


Tcherkezoff, S., 2000 'Are the Matai out of time' in E. Huffer and A. So'o, eds *Governance in Samoa* Canberra and Suva: Asia Pacific Press and Institute of Pacific Studies pp 113-132


Va'a, U, 2000 'Local Government in Samoa and the search for balance' in E. Huffer and A. So'o, eds *Governance in Samoa* Canberra and Suva: Asia Pacific Press and Institute of Pacific Studies pp 151-169