Introduction (ABSTRACT)

It has come to be widely accepted that political parties play a crucial role in democratic transition. In this context it has also come to be almost an article of faith that in order to play their proper role in advancing democracy such parties need to be ‘institutionalized’. However there is much less clarity about what institutionalization consists of. Building on earlier work (Randall and Svåsand 2002) this paper offers a way of thinking about party institutionalization. It then discusses why prospects for party institutionalization in emerging democracies of the developing world are not good, and indeed probably getting worse. At this point it becomes necessary to ask whether this really matters from a democratic point of view. Finally, assuming that it does, the paper considers how different circumstances, including forms of ‘political engineering’ and external democracy assistance, might improve or harm party institutionalization prospects.

Parties, democracy and institutionalization.

The vital contribution parties can make to democratic transition, and especially consolidation has become almost axiomatic. Recent restatements of this principle include Burnell (2004)\(^1\), Scarrow (2005) and Janda (2005). Only occasionally are dissenting, or implicitly dissenting voices heard as when Gabor (1997) suggests that weak parties have not conspicuously delayed democratization in Poland or Okole (2006) points out that Papua New Guinea is generally reckoned to have been successful in terms of installing democracy, despite having witnessed the ‘disappearance of a meaningful party system’.

\(^1\) ‘Political parties are crucial for long-term political development in emerging democracies’ (Burnell, 2004: 1)
In addition to this virtual consensus on the importance of parties there has been considerable agreement, when discussing what kinds of parties, and party systems, are most conducive to democracy or democratization, that a key criterion is the level of institutionalization (see for instance Lewis, 1994; Dix 1992). There has been serious effort put into thinking about what party system institutionalization would entail. Mainwaring and Scully’s criteria (1995) have been considered particularly helpful and quite widely applied. And clearly party system institutionalization is closely associated with party institutionalization (two out of four of Mainwaring and Scully’s criteria are really about the individual parties rather than the ‘system’), although, as discussed further in Randall and Svåsand (2002) one can conceive of situations in which the institutionalization of a given party may actually be harmful to party system institutionalization as a whole.

But when it comes to talking about the institutionalization of individual parties, the tendency has been to use this term without further elaboration, as part almost of the fashionable language of the ‘new political institutionalism’ (Lowndes, 2002). Sometimes it has been used almost as a synonym for ‘organized’. However organizations are not necessarily institutions, although over time they may institutionalize, and although institutions can have organizational aspects and develop within organizational contexts. More specifically parties are organizations but they may not develop into institutions.

To try and clarify thinking about parties as political institutions and the process of party institutionalization, in an recent article (Randall and Svåsand 2002), Lars Svåsand and I came up with a simple matrix of dimensions that drew on a number of earlier contributions. I am employing that matrix in the present paper, with certain modifications, intended in particular to give greater emphasis to the need for ‘social-rootedness’ which I now feel was understated in the earlier version.

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2 Mainwaring and Scully are concerned specifically with institutionalization of a competitive party system. This is seen to require that there is stability in the rules and nature of of interparty competition, that major political actors accord legitimacy to the electoral process and to parties, that political parties have ‘somewhat stable roots in society’ and that party organizations matter.

3 See that article for a fuller discussion of some of the issues raised in the next couple of pages.
Perhaps the originator of the notion of political institutionalization, Samuel Huntington (1968: 12), understood it as ‘the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability’. He saw it as encompassing four dimensions – adaptability, as demonstrated both by longevity and by functional adaptation; organizational complexity; autonomy or differentiation from other social groups; and coherence or the degree of consensus within the organization.

Panebianco, writing more directly about parties, was centrally concerned with the question of institutionalization. He understood this as ‘the way the organization “solidifies”’, or the process by which it ‘slowly loses its character as a tool: it becomes valuable in and of itself, and its goals become inseparable and indistinguishable from it. In this way, its preservation and survival become a “goal” for a great number of its supporters’ (1988: 49, 53). In order for this to happen, the party needs to develop a set of internal incentives which include both selective incentives for those with an interest in leadership and collective incentives to foster more diffuse loyalty to the party. He identified two main measures of the degree of institutionalization – autonomy and what he termed internal ‘systemness’ or the interdependence of different party sectors – which overlap considerably with Huntington’s criteria, but he excluded adaptability, suggesting instead that this might actually be impeded by a high degree of institutionalization.

More recently Levitsky (1998), with the example of Argentina’s Peronist Justicalist Party (PJ) very much in mind, has argued for an additional dimension of party institutionalization which, following Selznik (1957) he calls ‘value infusion’. Pointing out that both Huntington and Panebianco invoke ‘values’ in their definitions even while their stated criteria focus on more organizational features, Levitsky suggests we should distinguish between organizational routinization and value infusion. As demonstrated in the case of the PJ, which scores high on value infusion but where party rules and procedures are regularly disregarded, these will not always go together.
Finally Janda (1980) draws attention to the external aspects of party institutionalization, suggesting that an institutionalized party is one ‘reified in the public mind’. Developing this idea, Harmel and Svåsand (1989: 10) describe it as referring to the extent to which ‘the party has become part of the “routines” of other relevant actors in ways which suggest that they consider it to be an “established party”’. A number of discussions of party system, as opposed to party, institutionalization, most notably Mainwaring and Scully (1995) also stress the importance of parties being ‘rooted’ in society.

Building on these contributions we suggested that it is useful to think of party institutionalization as ‘the process by which the party becomes established in terms both of integrated patterns of behaviour and of attitudes, or culture’. But we also suggested that it is necessary to distinguish internal and externally related aspects of this process: ‘(1) internal aspects refer to developments within the party itself; external aspects have to do with the party’s relationship with the society in which it is embedded, including other institutions’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002: 12). This produces the two-by-two matrix depicted below.

**Figure 1 Dimensions of party institutionalization**

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<th>Internal</th>
<th>External</th>
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<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>Organizational systemness</td>
<td>Embedded decisional autonomy⁵</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attitudinal</td>
<td>Value infusion</td>
<td>Reification and support⁶</td>
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The ‘systemness’ dimension, using Panebianco’s term, is concerned with internal organizational cohesion, but understood to include both formal-rational and more informal aspects of organization. ‘Value infusion’ refers to the extent to which party

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⁴ Harmel and Svåsand make this point in the course of discussing right-wing ‘protest’ parties in Norway and Denmark.

⁵ I have modified the name of this dimension. In the original discussion it was ‘decisional autonomy’ but I have changed that here to ‘embedded decisional autonomy’ to emphasise the extent to which party institutionalization also requires the party to be socially embedded or rooted.

⁶ Likewise I have amended the name of this aspect so as to make clear it includes actual support.
actors and supporters develop an identification with and loyalty to the party, which transcends more instrumental considerations of their short-term interests.

The ‘embedded decisional autonomy’ dimension requires some further explanation. Although both Huntington and Panebianco stress the importance of party autonomy, not all are agreed. Janda (1980: 19) used the counterexample of the British Labour Party and its relationship with the trade unions, to argue ‘I believe that a party can be highly institutionalized and yet lack independence of other groups’. And it is understood that parties need linkage with social groups and rootedness in society. Instead of stressing autonomy as such, therefore, the requirement is for a degree of decisional autonomy, meaning that the party can make key strategic decisions without undue outside interference. Reification and support, lastly, refer to the extent to which the party is established in the public imagination but also the existence of a fairly identifiable, stable core of supporters in society.

Context

It’s clear on this basis that party institutionalization is a complex process and that different dimensions of institutionalization might not be developing simultaneously or to the same extent. In the following section I discuss what is known about the level and forms of party institutionalization in developing countries. But first it is necessary to provide a brief reminder of those contextual features of the developing world that have a particular bearing.

Here I am not talking about local institutional arrangements such as electoral systems, which also occur in developed countries, so much as more general aspects. This is a big topic but here I just focus on three: poverty, a background of colonialism and political authoritarianism, and implications of what can be awkwardly summarized as the present

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7 The notion of a territorially distinct developing world is obviously increasingly problematic but for present purposes I am using it mainly to refer to the former ‘Third World’ regions of Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Latin America and the Middle East. There is no wish here to deny the existence of major variations within and between these regions though arguably there are still significant and relevant differences between many or most of these countries and those of the developed world. For a fuller discussion see Randall, 2004.
global conjuncture. Poverty can be found everywhere but is still concentrated, if unevenly, in the developing world. Often it is exacerbated by economic liberalization and structural adjustment requirements that can be seen as coming under the head of the global conjuncture (to follow). Poverty has obvious implications for the resources available to parties, for instance the possibility of substantial membership dues, of party offices and means of communication. More profoundly extreme scarcity of resources affects motivations of actors involved. Especially when these resources are concentrated in the state with little scope for independent economic activity, politics can become a zero sum game, with politicians desperate to gain and then hold onto state power. For instance in both Asian and African countries ‘floor-crossing’, generally members of parliament from a minority party being persuaded to join the majority party, is a regular occurrence. Poverty and extreme social and economic inequality are also primary ingredients in the prevalence of clientelistic relationships in society at large and within political parties (discussed further in the following section).

Second, in contrast with the typically more evolutionary development of western democratic institutions, today’s political parties in the developing world, have mostly emerged from a background of authoritarian rule. It’s possible to see parties as an institutional form that was to some extent imposed by departing colonial rulers; even where they were not simply imposed but also reflected aspirations of a section of the indigenous community, they had not developed organically, and gradually, out of that community. Heo and Stockton (2005) for instance comment on how quickly in the wake of liberation from Japanese rule United States representatives expected South Korea’s party system to flourish, like ‘expecting a rose to blossom out of trashcan’. On the other hand many of the most influential and long-lasting parties, at least in Africa and Asia, emerged in this context of emancipation from colonial rule, and projected themselves as the embodiment of national unity and resistance.

Colonial rule itself may have contributed to the subsequent tendency, in former colonies, for authoritarian patterns of rule to emerge or reassert themselves after a period of more

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8 Even though this is banned in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka
9 Jung Bock Lee 2001, p142 cited in Heo and Stockton 2005, p 677
democratic government, with clear implications for party development. In particular for parties, other than those in power, authoritarian rule has meant disrupted development with negative consequences for party organization and the possibilities of party ‘institutionalization’.

Third we are living in an era of accelerated ‘globalization’. Arguably globalization tends to compound contextual differences between parties in the developed and developing world. This has particularly to do with timing: as Burnell (2005: 3) has succinctly observed, ‘the context which globalisation now provides to the development of parties and party systems all around the world, and in new democracies specifically differs profoundly from the international environment that faced political parties in the formative days of today’s long established democracies’. But developing countries have also tended to suffer disproportionately from the negative ‘side-effects’ of globalization, posing particular challenges for party formation and maintenance.

In political terms, reduced western support for authoritarian regimes and more positive pressures for democratic opening have meant that in a number of cases, especially in Africa, rather than representing the outcome of a gradual internal political process, in which political parties may have played some part or at least had time to establish themselves more securely, ‘founding’ multi-party elections have arrived at extremely short notice. In the first instance this has tended to favour ruling parties or those closely associated with the outgoing regime and at the same time to encourage a proliferation of ‘instant’ and often ephemeral new parties. Bratton and de Walle (1997:4) for example note that in sub-Saharan Africa no more than four years elapsed ‘between the beginning of the political protest movement in 1990 and 1993’s feverish round of elections’.

But as noted the economic dimension of globalization has tended to exacerbate social inequality. It is also widely recognized that the apparent inevitability of processes of economic globalization has diminished scope for meaningful ideological differences between parties. Moreover the perceived failure of democratically elected governments to manage the economy more successfully than preceding authoritarian rulers has
contributed in many parts of the developing world, to declining public faith in political parties altogether (though not in democracy as such).

There is finally the cultural dimension of globalization, and in particular developments in communications. In parts of the developing world, though least in Africa, such developments have been far-reaching. In western Europe similar changes have been associated with a trend away from old style mass membership parties to ‘catch-all’ or ‘electoral-professional’ parties\(^\text{10}\), but at least in this context parties are relatively well-established and rooted. In developing countries where parties are less well established they could be more damaging. For instance in Brazil, where parties are generally perceived to be weak and fragmented, Mainwaring (1995: 396) argues that the powerful television industry, which has grown over two decades, poses ‘a particularly formidable challenge to political parties...’ Another illustration is the dramatic rise, from nowhere, (and fall?) of the Thai Rak Thai party in Thailand; its media mogul leader Thaksin Shinawatra is regularly compared to Italy’s Sylvio Berlusconi.

**Party origins and clientelism**

Two further characteristic features of parties in developing countries partly reflect these contextual circumstances. The first concerns party origins, how parties are formed. As Panebianco (1988) notes, this has considerable bearing on their subsequent development. Of course, given the very interrupted pattern of party development it is often quite difficult to say when and how a particular party originated. In addition, whilst as already indicated there are some important parties that have in some sense arisen out of social movements, including those for national independence, these are exceptional (especially amongst newer ‘third wave’ parties). On the other hand, as compared with western democracies, there are many parties which have been formed by authoritarian regimes and even more so-called ‘personalist’ parties that have largely been created as a political vehicle for a single individual. In the former case the possibilities for autonomous

\(^{10}\) Though is this because party leaders have felt obliged to respond in this way or because changes in the media environment ‘have enabled party leaders to appeal directly to voters and thereby undermined the need for organizational networks’ (Mair, 1997: 39)
institutional development may be limited and in the latter the possibilities for any kind of institutionalization.

Secondly, any account of party institutionalization in developing countries has to take account of clientelism. In developing countries not only are parties embedded in clientelistic societies; they are, typically, heavily prone to clientelistic practices of one kind or another. This is true of all the main regions of the developing world and almost all the countries, though not all parties within them\(^\text{11}\). Explanations for the prevalence of party clientelism often distinguish between demand and supply factors, with poverty and dependency as part of the former and the absence of a professionalized state bureaucracy contributing to the latter, but these may also be exacerbated by political institutional arrangements\(^\text{12}\).

When thinking about the consequences of party clientelism for parties as institutions, we can draw on a typology recently developed to analyse the relationship between formal and informal political institutions. Lauth (2000) offers three categories of relationship – complementary, where formal and informal are mutually reinforcing, substitutive where either formal or informal can be effective and act as functional equivalents for each other, and conflicting, where they are incompatible with one another. Helmke and Levitsky (2003: 14) further differentiate within the conflicting category, between accommodating and competing relationships. In the latter (to which they incidentally assign clientelism as a whole) ‘(C)ompeting informal institutions structure actors’ incentives in ways that are incompatible with the formal rules’.

Although the early relevant literature suggested clientelism could play a positive role in party-building, more recently its implications for party institutionalization have nearly always been depicted as harmful. However it is also necessary to distinguish three different aspects of party clientelism. First is the system of patronage linking party leaders and subordinates within the party. This creates a chain of dependency, or where

\(^{11}\) Possible country exceptions include Chile. Party exceptions include PAN (at least formerly) in Mexico, Brazil’s PT and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami Party.

\(^{12}\) Such as certain electoral arrangements, strong presidential systems and federalism.
factionalism prevails, a series of chains, which subvert formal rules of decision-making, internal promotion, candidate selection and so on. Although there have been a number of well-institutionalized parties, for instance India’s Congress, and the AD and COPEI in Venezuela, in which for a substantial period at least internal clientelism coexisted with mass support, sectoral or affiliated organizations, a distinctive ideological profile, strong central party structures and so forth, these were parties which had an identity and institutional momentum before they began to build clientelistic networks. And even in these parties over time internal clientelism has come to be seen as a serious weakness, contributing in the case of Congress to what has been described as a process of ‘de-institutionalization’. For parties lacking such legacies or resources, especially parties that have largely taken form in response to new electoral openings often announced at very short notice, the negative implications of internal clientelism are likely to be felt more quickly.

Second is clientelism as an exchange of favours for votes or support between the party’s representatives and citizens at large. Whilst such favours have often taken quite elaborate ‘social work’ forms, with increasing party competition the long term trend seems to be for greater concentration on ‘electoral clientelism’, often simply ‘vote-buying’ at election time. Whilst party-citizen clientelism has been a mechanism of party building, establishing links with potential supporters for whom party politics might otherwise have little meaning, it also, especially in its electoral form, encourages an instrumental attitude to the party amongst its potential supporters and, associated with this, loyalty to individuals, local patrons who deliver, rather than to the party as a whole.

The third possible form of clientelism, as suggested by Kitschelt (2000) is when party leaders exchange favours for financial support from wealthy sponsors. This is sometimes referred to as ‘reverse clientelism’. With increased party competition and the rising costs of general elections, this form of clientelism seems to be extensive and on the rise. Of course something like this is not exactly unknown in western democracies. However

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13 There is some debate as to whether this should be considered clientelism at all but that will not be pursued here.
there are somewhat more effective mechanisms of accountability, including a mistrustful press, in those countries. Once more this form of clientelism has serious implications for the party’s institutional autonomy regarding funding and making policy.

**Parties as institutions in practice**

When it comes to assessing party institutionalization in the emerging democracies of the developing world, discussion must be limited both by present space constraints and by the amount and kind of relevant information that is easily available. There is a very large and constantly changing universe of parties even if we exclude the most ephemeral and focus attention on the more politically relevant\(^\text{14}\). Amongst these parties there are undoubtedly a number which for different reasons including longevity, links with government resources, close association with a major social movement, including a movement of national liberation, or with movement organizations like trade unions, have come to be perceived as relatively well institutionalized – for instance the Congress Party and BJP in India, Taiwan’s KMT, Malaysia’s UMNO, South Africa’s ANC, Chama Cha Mapinduzi in Tanzania, the AKP in Turkey, the PRI in Mexico, several of Chile’s parties, and Brazil’s Workers Party (PT). But apart from these admittedly important exceptions, the standard observation tends to be that parties in these regions are weakly institutionalized. Moreover, again with certain exceptions such as the PT in Brazil founded in 1980 or, possibly, the DPP in Taiwan formed in 1986, these relatively institutionalized parties stem from an earlier period, prior certainly to the democratization wave of the 1980s and 1990s, though of course there is some circularity in this reasoning, since parties need time to institutionalize.

**Internal organization aspects**

Considering first internal organizational aspects of institutionalization, whilst drawing on useful suggestions of both Panebianco (1988) and Janda (1980), I have found it helpful to think about organizational capacity under the following heads: scope (territorial and

\(^{14}\) I am not too concerned with the precise understanding of ‘relevant’ here. Different available definitions include the Laakso-Taagepera (1979) formula, which focuses on seat share or the Sartori (1976) definition of ‘effective parties’, that is main parties as well as those with blackmail or coalition leverage.
social reach), internal integration and rule-boundedness, and resources (including in particular membership, staffing and funds/capital assets).

The notion of scope relates primarily to the territorial reach of the party organization\textsuperscript{15}, in particular whether it is largely confined to particular regions, or to the town or countryside and whether there is an effective tier of local branches. In a number of developing countries, such as Turkey and Ghana, national laws now require parties’ organizations to be nation-wide in their territorial scope\textsuperscript{16}. But while significant as a recognition of international expectations of what parties should be like, these requirements are no guarantee in practice. There are parties like India’s Congress party, South Africa’s ANC (Lodge, 2004), Malaysia’s long-dominant UMNO (Case, 1966), Tanzania’s CCM (Barkan, 2000) and Brazil’s PT (Samuels, 2004) that have built extensive organizations. More generally, writing in the mid-1990s, Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 16) reported that in Costa Rica, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela ‘Parties are well organized, and although they are centralized, they have a presence at the local and national levels’. There are also the more ambiguous cases of parties closely related to a sponsoring movement or organization, whose widespread presence supplements the more strictly party organization. Examples include India’s BJP, from its inception closely linked with the Rahstriya Sevak Sangh (RSS), a major Hindu nationalist movement\textsuperscript{17}; the Islamic Action Front in Jordan which clearly operates in conjunction with the much more longstanding Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (Jonasson 2004) and also the (Peronist) Justicialist Party in Argentina whose quite flimsy organizational structure is buttressed by less formal, more spontaneous local and neighbourhood Peronist associations (Levitsky 1998).

Such territorially extensive organization is however probably exceptional. More typically even ‘national’ parties have only a limited organizational presence in terms of

\textsuperscript{15} Close to what Janda (1980) refers to as ‘extensiveness’. Similarly Mainwaring and Scully (1995) talk about the need for ‘territorial comprehensiveness’.

\textsuperscript{16} In Turkey, legally recognised parties are required to have organizations at neighbourhood, municipal and provincial level (Kemahliglou 2005). Ghana’s 2000 Political Parties Act says that to register as a national party, a party must be operational in all its 10 regions and at least \(\frac{2}{3}\)ths of the 110 districts (source: IDEA Political Parties Database).

\textsuperscript{17} But for a rather more positive recent assessment of local BJP party organization see Manor (2006).
geographical spread, relying at best on extra-organizational linkages at election times. As usual some of the extreme cases are in Africa. In Malawi, on one account the three main parties have offices in the three regions and a presence in most districts but regional party offices are generally delapidated with no or minimal equipment and staff, whilst at district level the party office could be situated in a bottle or grocery store (Patel, 2006). We’ve seen that many African opposition parties, faced with slender resources and difficulties of communication, restrict their organizational base to the main urban areas. Between elections, indeed, they may largely disappear, as Fomunyoh (2001) suggests with specific reference to countries of francophone Africa.

The idea of scope also includes the party organization’s social reach or the extent to which it extends into different sectors of society – what Janda refers to as ‘pervasiveness’. Beginning with the classic social democratic mass membership parties, parties in established western democracies have typically included sectoral, affiliated or auxiliary organizations for such categories as women, youth or students, labour and farmers. Similarly in the developing world, many of the more organized parties, particularly those based on movements for national liberation, for instance Congress in India, UMNO in Malaysia, Frelimo in Mozambique, and SWAPO in Namibia, have set up sectoral organizations.

The second aspect of organizational capacity, which I’m calling internal integration and rule-boundedness is in some ways the most difficult to pin down, but important nonetheless. On the one hand it is about how well the different units of the organization are welded together – here Panebianco talks about the degree of ‘homogeneity’, in terms of process and structure, at the same hierarchical level. On the other it has to do with party rules or procedures: to what extent have these been formalized, to what extent are they known within the party and to what extent adhered to? These two aspects are not quite the same thing. An additional underlying factor here is the effectiveness of internal communication.
Whilst systematic information about homogenization is hard to find, one would expect it to be most pronounced in highly centralized parties including communist parties. But it is also a feature of some highly organized religiously-based parties such as the Jamaat-e-Islam in Pakistan, which does not establish local branches as a matter of course but only where there is a party presence sufficient to sustain them. More typically, beyond a minimum of formal resemblances, the impression is that within many political parties, parallel party organizations operate very differently in practice (examples). This will particularly be the case where a party has formed out of a supposed merger of several pre-existing parties. It should be added that whilst this heterogeneity would normally be seen as a sign of organizational weakness, it is not automatically so. Yavuz (1997: 78) describes the organization of Turkey’s Welfare Party which operated on the rosary (the traditional Muslim rosary is the tesbih, with 33 beads) principle. At provincial and district levels were party units of 33 members; district inspectors oversaw the work of neighbourhood organizers who in turn appointed street representatives. But given this elaborate framework, districts were allowed considerable discretion on how to operate locally. Yavuz, who shows how this resulted in significant regional variations, suggests ‘One of the main reasons for the WP’s success is the relative autonomy of its district organization to utilize local resources, devise its own strategies, and adopt the local language to win elections’.

As stated, homogeneity of this kind and rule-boundedness are not the same thing. Increasingly however political parties are likely to have formal rules of some kind. I leave aside here the question of the content of these rules, although it is also interesting and relevant to the question of democracy to note that there are a small but growing number of cases in which national regulations require parties to adopt principles of internal democracy. There are certain exceptional parties which have well enunciated

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18 Information drawn from the International IDEA parties database
19 This increasingly successful party was closed down following military intervention in 1997. However not only was it based on a succession of earlier parties but it in turn formed the basis for the Virtue Party and, less directly, Turkey’s currently ruling Justice and Development (Party (AKP)
20 In anticipation of EU membership requirements, Article 69 of the Turkish Constitution was amended in 2001 to require that ‘The activities, internal regulations and operation of political parties shall be in line with democratic principles’. In South Asia, India, and since 2002 Pakistan, require evidence of internal elections before parties can register. In East Asia, government regulation of the internal functioning of
rules and to a significant extent adhere to them – two which receive most favourable mention in this respect are Brazil’s PT (Samuels, 2004) and the PDC in Chile (Huneeus, 2003). There are a number of others like South Africa’s ANC, or Congress in India, where there are rules, and they are to some degree known and again to some degree respected. However to the extent that clientelism is a significant feature of the internal operation of parties, whilst it may indeed contribute a kind of predictability and routineness of its own, this tends to run counter to, or in Helmke and Levitsky’s parlance ‘compete with’ official party procedure.

At an extreme there are parties whose operation bears only the slightest resemblance to their nominal rules (perhaps one symptom of this is the experience of many of IDEA’s interviewers that party officials were very unclear what their party’s rules were). Thus in Pakistan in several political parties, due to the concentration of power in the party leadership, not only is there little internal democracy but ‘party units at lower levels (district and union) are generally not encouraged’ (IDEA country study). Malawi’s ruling party, the UDF, which came to power defeating the party representing the former dictator Hastings Banda, has an elaborate constitution. This specifies that the party should hold at least one national conference a year with a number of reasons provided for holding additional ones, but not one single national conference has been held since 1993 when the party came to power. To quote Patel (2006: 37),

Much as hierarchy and administration of the party is well laid out in the Constitution in reality the scene is quite different – the hierarchy does not function and the party is virtually controlled by the Chairman. One senior member of the party said spontaneously that, some of the questions pertaining to financial matters of the party should be addressed to the owner of the party meaning the party Chairman.

parties has gone furthest in Thailand, following its 1997 Organic Law on Political Parties and in South Korea, especially following amendments to its Political Parties Act in 2000 (Thornton 2006), these both being polities which traditionally have particularly suffered from weak party organisation. In Africa, Ghana’s 2000 Political Parties Act states that parties’ internal organization should conform to democratic principles (IDEA). Chile’s 1987 Law on Political Parties specifies that top party leaders should be democratically chosen by rank-and file members, as one of a number of reforms actually intended by Pinochet to make life more difficult for parties. Much more recently Peru’s 2003 Political Party Law in Peru includes the provision that party authorities and candidates for public office should be elected in open or closed primaries (IDEA).
These traits of homogeneity and rule-boundedness are clearly to some degree dependent on the effectiveness of internal communication, meaning the extent and regularity of communication between central and outlying elements, including individual members, of the party organization. Depending in part on organizational resources and available technology, this could in principle take a range of forms from e-mail and dedicated websites to cyclostyled newsletters. Again available information suggests a considerable range in practice. Some religiously-based parties like India’s BJP and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami for instance appear to provide quite regular communication, particularly from the national organization, down to the membership, though rather less in the reverse direction. Likewise Brazil’s PT has well-established mechanisms of internal communication (Samuels, 2004). But such parties are the exception, and towards the other extreme cases are reported like Bangladesh where ‘communication among different levels of party organization is, on the whole, irregular, rudimentary and infrequent’, makeshift in nature and with a pronounced urban and specifically Dhaka, bias (Khan et al, 1996: 163), Lesotho, where communication is minimal and limited to verbal and print forms, and Malawi where there is a ‘lack of communications across the different levels’ in the three main parties (Patel, 2006: 60).

Possibilities of effective internal communication are undoubtedly in part a function of resources. We now turn more directly to the matter of resources, examining in particular three aspects – membership, paid party officials and funding. Heider (2005: 301) defines party membership as ‘an organizational affiliation by an individual to a political party, assigning obligations and privileges to that individual’. With implicit reference primarily to western Europe parties, he notes that parties usually keep a register of their members and issue membership cards, whilst members are normally expected to pay dues. At the same time, there has all along been the contrasting case of the United States, where it is suggested ‘there are no party members in any real sense’(Katz and Kolodny 1994). Moreover the more recent trend in western Europe has been for membership numbers to decline and for membership requirements to become less exacting.
One should not, therefore, exaggerate the contrast with parties in the developing world. Even so, whilst a complex picture emerges, membership rarely figures as a substantial, unambiguous and valued resource, even amongst the more established parties. Janda (1980) suggests that the maintaining of party records, especially national membership figures, though also archives, records of party leaders’ speeches and such, should itself be considered one indicator of organizational strength. In many, perhaps the majority of, developing countries membership figures for individual parties, or indeed all the main political parties have not been compiled nationally. But even where figures are available, there must be serious doubts about their reliability and questions about their meaning.

In western studies, and in the context of competitive elections, party membership density is often calculated taking membership as a percentage of the total votes the party received at the most recent election. On this basis party membership in Western Europe is said to have averaged around 13% in 1995 (Gallagher et al, 1995). Lewis (2001) suggests that average party membership rates are considerably lower in Eastern Europe. I have computed membership rates for some developing world parties that do provide membership figures (see Table 1). This makes clear the range. There are parties like the communist parties of India and of Brazil, but also Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islam, the PAN in Mexico, the union-based Democratic Labour Party in South Korea and to an extent the ANC in South Africa where rates are relatively-speaking very low. At the other extreme are parties claiming sometimes startlingly high membership rates. These figures may well be exaggerated. In the case of the BJP and UMNO they must also partly reflect the carpet-bagger effect, where people rush to join the winning party.

However what these figures do not communicate is the quality and meaning of membership. The parties with relatively low stated membership, listed above, all tend to

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21 This appears to be the case for instance for all parties in Lesotho, Burkina Faso, Malawi and Senegal, the Awami League and BNP in Bangladesh, most parties in Pakistan, and Renamo in Mozambique (IDEA political parties database). As late as 2000 it was reported that in Mexico ‘To this day, the PRI still has no complete membership list’ (Economist, October 26 2000).

22 Cited in Toole (2003)
have quite an elaborate recruitment procedure, in which a distinction is often made between probationary or associate membership and full or active membership. Thus, according to Greene (2001: 8) PAN uses a two stage process in which potential activists have to wait at least six months, take a minimum of two courses on the party programme and statutes and receive sponsorship from local-level activists as well as the National Registry. On the other hand very high membership rates can be an indication of very low membership requirements: anybody can be a member, without demonstrating commitment. In fact there are reports from several East Asian countries of parties virtually bribing people to become members, especially in anticipation of a general election. In Taiwan we hear that DPP membership has recently been boosted by nominal members, rentou dangyuan, recruited by local factional bosses who pay their dues, in order to increase their own influence within the party (Rigger, 2001), whilst in South Korea ‘New party members are often paid "gratitude fees" to reward them for their participation, and party membership swells in election seasons’ (Chan Wook Park, 2000). Most blatant of all are the recruitment methods of the Thai Rak Thai Party in Thailand which by the end of 2003 claimed a membership of nearly 11 million. To secure such members the wealthy party paid people either in kind or cash, with one observer reporting ‘I had never before seen so many people wearing t-shirts, jackets, and aprons sporting a party’s name and logo’.²³ According to McCargo (2005) Thai Rak Thai liked to be able to describe itself as a mass membership party since this had become something of a normative ideal in Thai political thinking but the real incentive was that parties received state funding determined – unusually- partly by the size of their membership.

Whilst, then, these examples do suggest contrasting membership recruitment patterns they also strikingly demonstrate the variable meaning – really to the point of non-comparability- of the concept of membership itself. Incidentally given these problems about the availability and meaning of membership figures it is hard to speak informedly about party membership trends, although Angell (2003?) refers to a downward trend in Latin American countries, and specifically in Chile.

The size of individual parties’ permanent staff is surely an important aspect of organizational capacity and one in respect of which parties are likely to be highly differentiated. Unfortunately available information is extremely limited. The general impression is that parties in developing countries are much less well-endowed with permanent or full-time, paid staff than their counterparts in the developed world. Such staff cost money and many parties can hardly afford them. The KMT in Taiwan, with its ample resources, is the outlier: it currently employs 1,700 permanent staff, nearly ten times that employed by its rival, the DPP (Taipei Times, 2004). On the other hand, impoverished Lesotho is one country where we are told no parties have any paid officials (IDEA country study) and there must be many others in tropical Africa. In Zambia, the former ruling party UNIP has 11, the MMD has two and the rest have none (Momba 2006). On the other hand, within Africa, the ANC has a significant permanent staff, even though in 1997, three years after it came to power, in a climate of economic constraints it was obliged to retrench numbers from 560 to 397 (Lodge, 2004). In Latin America, Brazil’s Workers’ Party employed 180 permanent staff at national level in 2004 (Samuels, 2004).

Much more is known concerning party funding, although one of the things that is known is that individual party financial records are generally either inaccessible or unreliable. At the same time there is a growing trend for some national regulation of party finance, in terms of what forms of funding are permissible and what must be declared, although the adoption of such regulation is uneven – in Africa it only applies to one in five countries – and its effectiveness often limited.

Democratization may require political parties but it also strains their budgets. It’s repeatedly noted that parties’ funding needs have grown with the increasing costs of election campaigns (itself in large part a function of increasing party competition and media costs). For instance this is a trend reported in a number of Latin American

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24 Although this represents a substantial drop from the figure of 5000 reported in the early 1990s
25 An excellent source is the IDEA Handbook (Austin and Tjernström, 2003) which includes sections on Africa, Latin America and East Asia respectively.
26 As related particularly for Africa by Erdman (2006)
countries, whilst Ferdinand (2003) refers to the escalating election costs in South Korea. But in Africa too, and relatively speaking, elections are increasingly becoming ‘horrendously expensive’ (Saffu, 2003) 27.

Parties can in theory derive income from a number of sources. Firstly membership dues. This has indeed been an important source for some parties, with loyal core memberships. For instance the opposition DPP in Taiwan largely source – in 1990 accounting for 72% of its income – until state funding was introduced in 1997 (Rigger, 2001). Similarly much of the Brazilian Workers’ Party’s funds is said to have come from its membership (Samuels, 2004). And a different kind of exception is the Jamaat-e-Islam in Pakistan whose members are required to contribute their Islamic tax or ‘zakat’ to party funds. But in many Latin American countries a decline in membership dues is reported along with the decline in membership, whilst we have seen that in much of Africa the sense is rather that people ought to be paid to be members (Saffu, 2003).

One alternative source of funding is a levy on the salaries of party members elected to public office. Though instances are not widely reported, this is practised by Taiwan’s DPP. Donations from foreign agencies are another, although these are banned in many countries, including most of Latin America, India, Malaysia, and, in Africa, Malawi and Ghana.

Given growing election costs and concerns, discussed further below about parties’ recourse to more questionable and compromising sources of finance, across the developing world interest has been growing in the option of state funding for parties. In Latin America, including Central America, there is a cross-national trend towards adopting some system of state funding, generally with hurdles of some kind imposed, in terms of a minimum share of the vote or legislative seats, for parties to qualify. Despite

27 Especially in Nigeria. According to Saffu (2003: 23), ‘(in February 1999) the amounts of money that the presidential aspirants had to raise were staggering by any standard. Indeed they made the amounts involved in presidential campaigns in the USA pale into insignificance’.
growing interest in Africa, this process has not gone anything like so far\cite{28}. It has also incidentally been suggested in Burkina Faso\cite{29} and Namibia (Boer, 2004), that state subsidy for parties during elections has been a main motivation for the creation of numerous parties which subsequently disappear or atrophy. In South Asia, only Sri Lanka has adopted state funding but in South-East Asia it has been adopted by a succession of countries\cite{30}.

In considering the overall financial position of parties, we need also to take account of their capital assets. These could range from office buildings, to investment portfolios to major business corporations. Again the wealthiest parties, in this sense, include Taiwan’s KMT, UMNO in Malaysia and Golkar in Indonesia (Sachsenroder, 1998). The KMT, which has been described as the world’s richest party, has ownership interests in dozens of companies whose value, although it has never published accounts for them, by the early 1990s was rumoured to be around $1.5bn (Ferdinand, 2003: 60; Fields, 2002). Similarly under Mahathir’s leadership, UMNO acquired a substantial investment portfolio, although with some continuing ambiguity as to how far these actually were party assets as opposed to assets of individual party leaders. On a much more modest scale, some older ruling parties in Africa, such as Zanu-PF in Zimbabwe, are reported to have investment portfolios (Saffu, 2003). In Zambia, UNIP the former ruling party helped finance its 2001 election campaign by the sale of one of its companies (IDEA country study).

However, for most parties, the key source of funding has to be private donations. In some cases these might come from sponsoring or affiliated organizations, such as trade unions\cite{31}. But domestically, the major contributions usually come from wealthy

\begin{itemize}
  \item \cite{28} By 2002 available information suggested that state funding has been adopted in 14 countries in some form, but in only three of these – Morocco, the Seychelles and South Africa, (plus Zimbabwe if it had actually been implemented) - would the amounts envisaged be sufficient to make a difference for opposition parties (Saffu, 2003)
  \item \cite{29} In International IDEA country report 2005 (author’s name not given)
  \item \cite{30} Including Malaysia, Thailand in 1995, both South Korea and Taiwan following reforms in 1997 and still more recently in Indonesia.
  \item \cite{31} Whilst the role of trade union contributions is commonly observed, specific examples are hard to pin down, one exception being the MMD in Zambia (Saffu, 2003)
\end{itemize}
individuals and business, and notably big business. We have already considered whether and when it is appropriate or useful to look on this as a form of ‘reverse clientelism’. At any rate such private donations play a crucial and apparently increasing role in party funding in all regions of the developing world. In Africa, Saffu notes ‘the really huge donations, counted in thousands and millions of dollars in an economic environment of desperate poverty where gross domestic product (GDP) per capita per year might be only some USD 300, or even less, could only be made by business tycoons’. A similar story emerges for Latin and Central America. In Central America, Casas and Zovatto (2005) suggest that the quest for domestic election funds focuses on a very small group of major businesspeople, based in particular in the construction and banking sectors, in the media and most worryingly in drug-trafficking. As already argued, the source of this funding together with the tendency for it to be channeled via individual politicians has serious implications for party cohesion and control.

**Value infusion**

‘Value infusion’ is the other internal dimension of party institutionalization. It refers to the strength of a distinctive party culture or value-system and can be a vital source of party cohesion especially where more strictly organizational mechanisms are weak. This kind of transcending loyalty has been a notable feature of a range of party types in western democracies, although the trend over time has been towards more pragmatic catch-all and electoralist parties. In many cases this dimension has been nurtured by party activists and followers’ extensive involvement in a range of ancillary organizations, so that their party attachment has been embedded in a whole way of life.

In the developing world, such transcendent commitment has certainly been evident in a number of parties, including many of the most important political players. Typically these have been parties originating in mass social and political movements and experiencing a long formative phase in opposition, including for example India’s Congress Party and South Africa’s ANC, based on movements for national liberation, or

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32 Including socialist and social democratic mass membership parties in their earlier stages, many Christian parties and especially parties on the far Left and Right -
India’s BJP, and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan based on religious movements. However, Mexico’s PAN, which also scores, or used to score, high on value-infusion, was formed by a small, relatively elite though strongly Catholic, grouping (Mizrahi, 2003). And whilst another high scorer, Brazil’s Workers’ Party, has been based on independent unions and ‘new’ social movements, it was founded as recently as 1980.

There is evidently considerable overlap in parties that exhibit ‘value-infusion’ and those enjoying ‘systemness’. However the two do not always coincide which is one good argument for distinguishing between them. Thus the PAN, despite its committed membership cadres, is generally characterized as suffering from a weak organizational infrastructure (Mizrahi, 2003). The distinction is especially relevant to Argentina’s PJ. Levitsky (2003: 3) emphasizes the organizational disarray that has historically characterized this party at all levels bar the local Base Units: ‘its internal structure is fluid…lacks a central bureaucracy, effective party organs, and routinized internal rules and procedures’. But the party (the extent to which this can be separated from the movement is discussed further below) has remained suffused with a vague but strongly felt commitment to Peron and peronism.

The case of the PJ demonstrates that ‘charismatic’ personal leaders can be a potent source of value-infusion. Typically this will not outlive the individual who gave rise to it, but where charisma is to a degree ‘routinized’, as in the PJ or the AIADMK in India’s Tamilnadu, dedicated to the memory of film star MGR, it can last longer. In this connection should be mentioned the part played by powerful family ‘dynasties’ in so many South Asian parties, with the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty in the Congress Party only the most well known. Although a key mechanism through which such dynasties perpetuate themselves is patronage, as potent party symbols they also help to generate party loyalty and identification which survive the passing of individual family members.

As with systemness, it is possible to identify cases where value-infusion and party clientelism have coexisted, and even where clientelism in its more deferential, traditional form could almost be said to complement (in Lauth’s term) value-infusion. A good
though dated illustration is the case of Peru’s Popular revolutionary American Alliance (APRA) (Stein 1999). Nonetheless the broader tendency must be, especially as party competition increases, for the more short-term opportunistic aspects of clientelism to come to the fore and work against transcending party loyalty.

The issue of value-infusion raises one further question that will lead us on to the topic of decisional autonomy. This is the question of to whom or what the loyalty is directed. In cases where the party is based in a movement which persists as a significant force outside the party, whilst value-infusion may benefit the party as an organization, it may primarily derive from loyalty to the movement – or its leader. This seems to have been the case to a large extent in Argentina’s PJ. White (2002: 5) describes something similar in Turkey’s Welfare Party, the predecessor of today’s AKP. When at the end of 1997 the Constitutional Court decided to shut the party down, to her surprise she found WP activists unconcerned. One said ‘If they close the party, then a few politicians lose their jobs; that’s all. It has no effect on us. We’re a social movement, not a party’. In these instances, identification with a movement rather than, or as much as, with a party, could have been advantageous for the party since it enabled that identification to survive during periods when the party as an organization was weakened and suppressed. But in other cases, as discussed below, it could threaten the party’s decisional autonomy.

Embedded decisional autonomy

This brings us to the ‘external’ dimensions, beginning with the structural component, the (embedded) decisional autonomy dimension. The party’s decisional autonomy is most obviously restricted where it has been created by the government or regime – as in the case of Egypt’s National Democratic Party (NDC), originally founded in 1978 by

33 According to Stein (1999: 128) there was a powerful moral, almost familial, bond between members of the party-movement leading ‘many outside observers to believe that the loyalty of Apristas to their party far surpassed all other loyalties’. But whilst its leader Haya and his followers enjoyed elaborating complexities of aprista doctrine, they never expected the ‘masses’ of urban workers to understand these, mindful of the ‘ignorance that predominates in our working classes’ (Haya, cited by Stein 1999: 122). Instead these workers’ were happy to delegate such matters to the Jefe (chief) and whilst they identified with the party, a ‘primary element’ in their adherence was ‘the accessibility it provided to links with men above them on the social pyramid’ (Stein 1999:132) and the clientelistic benefits this could bring.
president Sadat. But decisional autonomy can also be compromised in cases where the party is overly dependent on its sponsoring movement organization.

In structural terms the issue of party embeddedness versus autonomy overlaps with the question raised earlier, under organizational capacity, about the penetrative scope or pervasiveness of the party organization. Rootedness includes links not only to different social groups, or through sectoral party organizations, but with relatively independent social organizations such as trade unions or religious bodies. Especially in the case of parties emerging in opposition to established ruling parties, these forms of links and ‘sponsorship’ may be essential to provide the party with resources and support. To Janda’s example of the British Labour Party’s relationship with the trade unions can be added for instance those of the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) in Zambia as it emerged to challenge the ruling UNIP in the early 1990s, and more recently of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe, both to a degree sponsored by trade unions, churches and other civil society organizations. However in cases where a single external movement organization originally formed the party as its ‘political arm’, and that organization has continued to flourish, there are more serious threats to the party’s decisional autonomy.

A good illustration here is the contrasting experiences of Argentina’s PJ and India’s BJP. For a long time trade unions formed the ‘backbone’ of the Peronist movement. In fact Peron had suppressed the independent trade unions but then incorporated unions into the movement-party. After Peron’s ouster, especially during the period of harsh political repression 1955-73, these unions played a critical role in the movement/party’s survival – forming ‘hubs of PJ activity, providing office space, money, printing presses, and jobs’

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34 The archetypal but by now rather out-dated example is ARENA in Brazil, created by the military dictatorship in 1966 out of a number of existing Congress deputies. The coherence both of ARENA and the official opposition party was further weakened by the introduction of the intra-party list system, meaning separate factions could coexist within the party and present their own lists for elective posts. ‘ARENA was already denied any positive or independent role in the legislature at national level, and this decision ensured that it would have no coherence at local level either. Playing no role in policy formation, the party became a patronage machine, and elections became a contest between rival factions to win control of state patronage at local level’ (Cammack 1988: 126)
(Levitsky 2003: 92) - and exercised considerable informal influence though this was never formalized. Later, however, with the return of competitive party politics, and in a situation where economic liberalization had reduced the unions’ economic leverage, the party leadership was able to marginalize the unions within the party.

The BJP’s relationship with its sponsoring organization the Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS, or National Volunteer Corps) has been, arguably, much more problematic for the party. The BJP was itself formed in 1980 but it was based on an earlier party, the Jan Sangh, in turn formed in 1951 by the RSS. The RSS is a very large, disciplined, movement organization committed to the cause of Hindu nationalism, and linked to a still more extensive ‘family’ of Hindu communalist associations. Following the assassination of Gandhi by a militant Hindu in 1948, the RSS was forbidden to engage in political activity and so established the Jan Sangh as its political arm. As compared with the Jan Sangh, the BJP has been much more determined to win elections in which it has proved very successful, which has meant moderating its original stance in order to broaden its electoral appeal. However it has been extremely reliant on the RSS cadres to mobilize the local vote. There is moreover considerable overlap in membership: senior party figures, particularly the older generation, are largely drawn from RSS cadres. Inevitably all this has given rise to severe tensions between the two organizations. The RSS leadership has been continuously critical of the BJP’s political stance, a tendency exacerbated now that the BJP is out of national office. At a BJP national executive meeting in Chennai in 2005, following the party’s 2004 electoral defeat, it was clear that Advani had been almost compelled by the RSS to offer his resignation as party as President of BJP. But Advani was also reported as saying that ‘lately an impression has gained ground that no political or organisational decision (of the BJP) can be taken without the consent of the RSS’ and that ‘this perception will do no good either to the party or to the RSS’.

Another instance where a sponsoring movement-organization is widely perceived to impinge on the party’s decision-making autonomy is the case of Jordan’s Islamic Action Front. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has had a long continuous existence going

35 It currently claims to have nearly 50,000 shakhas or base units (www.rss.org accessed Mar 24 2006)
back to the 1940s and 50s. It has been committed to promoting the Islamic way of life, including the adoption of Sharia law, and has enjoyed a relatively privileged status. It formed the Islamic Action Front in 1992, after enactment of the new Party Law, which authorised the formation of political parties. That law proscribes close association between a party and a social movement. The IAF’s leader also insists that the party is completely independent of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, as we have seen, the party is heavily dependent on the Brotherhood to mobilize electoral support. Possibly a majority of IAF members are in the Brotherhood and it is plausibly claimed by the party’s critics, that Brotherhood members form a majority both of its Founding Committee and of its ruling body, the Shura Council, to the resentment of their independent members (Jonasson, 2004).

Reification and support
We come finally to the attitudinal dimension of the party’s external relationships, or ‘reification’, which is about external recognition and legitimacy, and support. There is not much in the relevant party literature to draw on concerning reification but one could make an initial distinction between on the one hand attitudes in the public at large, as indicated by knowledge about the party and, on the other, the recognition implied in the conduct of other political institutions, including other parties. Obviously one vital requirement for reification is time. Whilst potentially an obstacle to party institutionalization in other respects, charismatic leadership could also be an advantage in projecting the party to a wider public, as for instance in the case of Mexico’s Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) under the leadership of Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas (Prud’homme 2004-5).

But a further advantage in projecting the party to a wider public is likely to be access to the mass media. Especially where the state still controls the broadcasting media, ruling parties have been able to exploit these media links, as for instance in the case of India’s

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36 The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was formed in 1946 with branches in Jordan. The Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood proper was founded in 1953 (Jonasson, 2004).
37 There is of course some data, already referred to concerning the public’s faith in political parties as a whole.
38 That charismatic leadership role may now be transferring to López Obrador.
Congress Party and the state owned Doordashan, in the 1970s and 80s. In addition, some parties, or their leaders, have had privileged access to the private broadcasting media. One example is the short-lived PRN in Brazil whose leader’s success in the 1988 presidential election was surely assisted by his strong family ties with Brazil’s dominant television network, TV Globo and the endorsement of its director, Roberto Marinho (De Lima, 1993). Another is the Thai Rak Thai party in Thailand. Its leader Shinawatra’s family company Shincorp bought a controlling share in Thailand’s only independent broadcaster, ITV, on the eve of the 2001 general election. Just before the election, ITV journalists complained that Shinawatra was interfering with their coverage as a result of which three were fired39. As these two instances suggest, however, whilst this kind of media access can help to project the party, thereby contributing to ‘reification’, this may well be at the cost of internal organizational development or systemness.

Obviously there is a great deal more than can be said about support, and here I can only provide a sketchy overview. It should be noted at the outset that, especially given the frequent ambiguity of the notion and content of party membership already described, the party’s boundaries, as marked by membership, may be quite hazy, making it more difficult to say whether a given supporter is inside or outside the party. We can also note the frequently observed tendency for electoral clientelism, whose incidence actually increases as party politics becomes more competitive, to erode specific party loyalties40.

Though we can track overall levels of electoral support for particular parties, we do not have information about the consistency with which individuals vote for one party rather than another. There is evidence, much of it indirect, about the support of distinct social constituencies. This suggests that the tendency over time in Latin America has been for parties to become less distinctive in terms of their social base and in that sense more ‘catch-all’. Such a tendency is of course also apparent in European parties. Socially


40 Wang (2001) estimates that in the 1993 municipal elections in Taiwan, the KMT suffered around 45 per cent leakage of votes it had ‘bought’. This might be an extreme case, however, partly reflecting the untainted appeal of the newcomer DPP.
distinct parties are also insignificant in a number of East and South-East Asian countries including Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines. However elsewhere, for instance in much of Africa and in India, ethnically or religiously-based parties are significant and if anything becoming more so.

A potentially useful measure of party support or loyalty in this context would be that of ‘party identification’. There are of course general problems with this concept and its operationalisation, but the main problem in regard to the developing world is the shortage of data. Levels of party identification in western countries are typically reported to be relatively high, though the trend is downwards. Available evidence suggests that in developing countries by contrast the level tends to be much lower, though also varied. Mainwaring (1998: 73) finds this evidence points to ‘a chasm between most of the advanced industrial democracies and most of the third-wave countries’, though his information on the developing world is largely confined to data from Latinobarometro. Norris (2004) draws on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Six countries from the former Third World participated in its first phase. Again the most striking pattern is their relatively low levels of party identification. However, taking Mainwaring together with Angell (ND c 2003), who provides details of a number of studies in Latin America, internal contrasts emerge with Uruguay where rates have been consistently high over several decades at one extreme and Argentina and Venezuela, whose rates have been lower and declining at the other. In the data cited by Norris, rates of party identification are particularly low in Thailand.

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41 It may not be sufficiently independent from actual voting behaviour to warrant separate study, and, when it comes to comparisons, the questions asked to establish party identification have varied in different studies, thereby limiting possibilities of cross-national comparison.

42 This is a collaborative project based at the University of Michigan. The relevant surveys covered the period 1996-2002, and the question asked was ‘Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?’. The six ‘developing’ countries which took part are Mexico which scored relatively high with 48% replying ‘Yes’, Taiwan (32%), South Korea (23%), Peru (22%), Chile (20%) and Thailand (14%). See Norris (2004) Chapter 6 and Figure 6.1

Party institutionalization and its prospects

This general overview, then, has demonstrated the relatively low levels of party institutionalization in developing democracies, how this relates to the different aspects of institutionalization and suggested some of the main contributory factors. But it also suggests that despite the variety of parties and settings prospects for greater party institutionalization are not especially good. In general the more institutionalized parties are those with roots in the pre-transition era, often originally based on movements for national independence, social revolution or both. These were movements and then parties which attracted loyalty and nurtured identification, in situations where there was as yet minimal access to state resources to provide other motives for activism and support. Presently there seem to be two rather divergent potential paths to greater party institutionalization. On the one hand in a few of the most ‘developed’ countries, notably Chile and Taiwan, you find reasonably established parties together with basic welfare provision that helps to weaken the culture of dependency which party clientelism thrives upon. Even here of course there are contrary pressures including the impact of the media. On the other, some of the newly emerging religiously-based parties, in the Middle East and Asia, outside of Latin America, can draw on committed membership and supporters, although there may be problems regarding the party’s organizational autonomy in respect of the movement organizations in which it is embedded.

Does democracy need institutionalized parties?

Does it matter that political parties in the developing democracies appear to be weakly institutionalized, with typically little prospect or becoming more so, from the point of view of democracy itself? As Taylor-Robinson notes (2001: 582) institutionalized parties are not necessarily democratic: ‘Institutionalization is concerned with order and

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44 Even if in Chile this is being ‘rationalised’ whilst in Taiwan it is in its early stages. In this context it is interesting to note that Lodge (2004), whilst reporting some elements of factionalism and clientelism in South Africa’s ANC argues that there are limits because the state bureaucracy has unusually extensive penetration for a developing country, as reflected for instance in the universal system of pensions.

45 Leaving aside the question of whether this is the most significant contribution that parties can make, as opposed to say the contribution to stability, freedom from violent conflict, social transformation.
stability rather than democracy. I have already suggested there are cases where party institutionalization is not automatically desirable. For instance this might be claimed in the situation of an emerging democracy in which the former ruling party was strongly entrenched and there needed to be a degree of de-institutionalization in order to produce greater balance in the system as a whole. We also saw that institutionalization does not necessarily mean adaptability, which is why Panebianco was careful to separate the two. In the much-cited case of Venezuela, the two long dominant parties, AD and COPEI, arguably became excessively institutionalized, imparting too great a degree of rigidity to the pattern of party representation and leaving the way open for a non-party politician, former General Chavez. Finally we’ve seen that the cases of Poland or Papua New Guinea – and one might add South Korea – could suggest that institutionalized parties are not an essential prerequisite for democratization.

But leaving aside, these qualifications, elsewhere (Randall and Svåsand 2002) suggestions have been made about some of the main ways in which political parties could be expected to contribute to democracy, or democratic consolidation. These include representation and integration/political education (citizen-oriented), aggregating interests and recruiting/training leaders (linkage-oriented) and making government accountable and providing opposition (government-related). Without being able to develop these further in the confines of this paper, one can still ask how far parties need to be ‘institutionalized’ to perform these roles.

One could argue that in order to perform the citizen-related roles, parties need to be institutionalized but that that is not sufficient. In order to provide citizens with meaningful choice there needs to be well-established (‘reified’) parties. However both representation and the instilling of democratic norms of behaviour require parties that are not simply socially rooted and (relatively) rule-bound but whose rules to some degree incorporate democratic values and procedures. Similarly aggregating, as opposed to simply selecting out, ‘interests’ and also instilling democratic norms through leadership

46 Although she has a rather limited idea of what party institutionalization entails and in practice seems to largely equate this with being traditional.
training require broadly democratic not just regularised internal procedures. But institutionalization helps: one regular complaint in parties whose procedures have not been regularized in this way is that party leaders and especially party candidates for public office are ‘parachuted’ in from outside the party organization proper⁴⁷. Perhaps the most crucial role for parties in consolidating democracy⁴⁸ is the provision of effective opposition and here institutionalization seems key, in ensuring party unity as a whole in the face of threats or blandishments, and discipline within the legislature, rather than carpet-crossing and uncoordinated voting.

**Deliberate measures to encourage party institutionalization**

Even if it has been shown that party institutionalization is important for democratization, it does not however follow either that we should or that it would be easy to promote specific measures to encourage it. Without wishing to indulge in excessive guilt-tripping, it can certainly be argued that ‘external’ actions and influence have contributed to the obstacles in the way of party institutionalization to date. Perhaps the best policy is for external actors to back off. And measures adopted by national governments in the countries concerned may be of dubious motivation or ineffective. This is the more so given that institutionalization is precisely about autonomous development, about acquiring a degree of independent life, and moreover that it is partly ‘a product of time’ and of slow-growing traditions (Scarrow, 2005: 6).

Regarding direct forms of external assistance, membership of transnational party organizations, such as the Socialist or Liberal Internationals, may bring valuable external legitimation. It is difficult not to conclude that otherwise the most significant contributions that democracy assistance can make to party institutionalization are likely to be indirect. Thus various initiatives such as those of the UNDP (2003) in capacity

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⁴⁷ For instance there were complaints that members of Malaysia’s growing corporate middle class, *Melayu Baru*, were being parachuted into UMNO leadership positions (source? ). Levitsky (2003) suggests that in Argentina’s PJ where rules concerning career advancement, tenure security and candidate and leader selection are poorly routinized, leaders can be parachuted in and also easily removed.

⁴⁸ Burnell (2005) suggests, however, that this becomes important after democracy has consolidated. Too effective an opposition in the early stages could be destabilizing.
development for MPs could encourage a more disciplined and more policy-oriented parliamentary party. Again in different ways citizens could be encouraged to expect more of political parties. This is one of the conclusions for instance of Morgan et al (2005: 13) reflecting on the problems of weak party institutionalization in Melanesia. They talk about the need to ‘conceptualise strategies for targeting local people’s expectations of representation and reciprocity from their MPs’. And still less directly, external assistance in developing the capacity and institutional autonomy of state bureaucracies could help to reduce the opportunities for party clientelism (developing state welfare entitlements would reduce demand for clientelism but that, outside a very few countries, is not going to happen).

Measures adopted by national governments may also have a bearing on party institutionalization. Thus, as already noted some party laws require parties to demonstrate a national organizational presence (one criterion we have suggested of the organizational aspect of institutionalization). However this may be asking a great deal of parties at an early stage of their development. As Janda (2005: 19) remarks, creating a party is a ‘risky business’ and this requirement sets the initial organizational threshold very high. There is also the danger that it will discriminate against territorially concentrated minorities, and their ability to form their own party, as argued has been the case for several Amerindian communities in Latin America (Birmir, 2001)49.

Conclusion

Party institutionalization is a complex and lengthy process. It has faced particular obstacles in the context of developing democracies and there is little reason to suppose that prospects will substantially improve. This is at a time when of course parties in established democracies are also supposed to be undergoing some degree of ‘de-institutionalization’ but that is from much stronger initial institutional base. From the point of view of democratization, there is some cause for concern, since parties do generally play a key role in that process and even though it is not necessarily

49 Cited in Reilly (2005)
synonymous with internal democracy, party institutionalization can make a difference especially in terms of providing effective opposition and government accountability. But by definition party institutionalization is very difficult to induce externally. Indirect approaches are likely to be more effective than direct, which may actually be counterproductive.

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TABLE 1 Party membership rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Membership</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Membership rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANC (South Africa)</td>
<td>10,878,251</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>440,708</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP (India)</td>
<td>86,562,209</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>30,000,000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP (Brazil)(^{30})</td>
<td>1,607,393</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPM (India)</td>
<td>19,695,767</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>796,073</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Labour Party (South Korea)</td>
<td>2,733,769</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>61,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP (Taiwan)</td>
<td>3,471,429</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat.-e Islam (Pakistan)(^{51})</td>
<td>3,349,436</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT (Taiwan)</td>
<td>3,190,081</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,090,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAN (Mexico)(^{52})</td>
<td>8,303,417</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMNO (Malaysia)</td>
<td>2,483,249</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>80.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ Party (Brazil)(^{53})</td>
<td>8,800,000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{50}\) These are figures for the following election. And they are described as ‘active’ members.
\(^{51}\) This is actually the vote for MMA, an alliance of four parties dominated by Jamaat-e-Islam. And 15000 applies to full members only.
\(^{52}\) These figures refer to the following election.
\(^{53}\) Source Samuels, 2004.